Contents
李乐成接替金壮龙工信部长，李克强马仔上位。习近平马仔被免职。四中全会什么时候开。贸易战给中国加关税是40%不是10%
大家好，辽宁省长李乐成接替金壮龙担任工信部长。这个我早就说金壮龙要抓了，结果到现在还没有抓，还是金壮龙同志。不过无所谓，金壮龙同志的政治生命已经结束了。我是2024年9月11日预测上海市委常委朱芝松要被抓，很不幸。
2024年11月26日，两个半月之后，朱芝松被抓，向他表示哀悼。这玩意不是说抓就能抓的。我们在这儿吹，说抓谁不是一句话的事情吗？实际操作中可能没有那么简单。昨天，我说过，如果是习近平一句话，说抓谁就抓谁，那么胡锦涛和江泽民的人不早就被习近平抓光了。
现在反过来也是一样。他也不是胡锦涛或者温家宝，一句话，说抓谁抓谁。每一条抓人的新闻的背后，不知道干了多少工作呢。去银行查他们的帐，调查他们，有很多的工作的要做，攒够了黑材料。不下去也得下去了，金壮龙不下去就抓了了。到时候也由不得金壮龙。啪，材料拍在这里。贪污这么多钱不滚蛋怎么办呢？肯定是有把柄了。胡温的马仔也都是贪官，共产党没有官员不是贪官。不过现在胡温掌权的话，他肯定不让查自己人。都是这个套路。中国没有反腐败，只有以反腐败的名义进行政治斗争。
我们按照这个时间线来推就行了，朱芝松金壮龙应勇，应该是一条线上的。 我说要抓朱芝松，两个半月后才抓了。金壮龙更是半年之后才免职的。有过四个月。按照这个时间线来推，即便应勇要抓，至少还得4个月。最后，黑材料放在那里，把柄放在那里。应勇要么退要么抓，没得选择。但是这肯定是选择性执法。中纪委现在也不在习近平手里控制，中纪委主要就是李希和刘金国说了算。以前习近平能说了算，是因为中纪委书记王岐山和习近平是一家人。
三中全会之后，习近平的人，就一个也没有上来过。大家看都什么人都能上来，令计划，周永康，孙政才，黄兴国，这些都是被习近平抓了的官员的徒子徒孙都能上来。说白了，他们都是反习派的人。邓朴方的大秘都能上来。邓朴方那个残联主席，还是名誉主席，都被习近平拿掉了。接替邓朴方那个杨晓渡就是习近平的人，之前是中纪委的二把手。就是一把手和二把手才能说了算。以前习近平能控制中纪委就是因为王岐山是一把手，杨晓渡是二把手。
现在中纪委一把手二把手，李希和刘金国他就不是习近平的人。要不然习近平还能抓胡锦涛和江泽民的人。胡锦涛和江泽民被王岐山和杨晓渡抓怕了，所以千方百计控制中纪委。美国不是有个说法，把司法部武器化作为政治斗争的工具。中国这个中纪委武器化，作为政治斗争的工具，就是从王岐山开始的。大家看现在中纪委二把手刘金国是在王岐山的任期之内，被安插进中纪委的。就是当时江泽民已经被抓王岐山抓的肉痛了，所以安排刘金国进中纪委。
这就是相互的，就是你习近平能玩中纪委，我江泽民也能玩中纪委。你既然能用中纪委抓人，我也能用中纪委抓人。中纪委不过是政治斗争的一个工具而已。中纪委也只能影响10%，最多20%的人事布局。主要还是中组部说了算。所以三中全会之前，习近平即便没有控制中纪委， 也基本能稳住大局。无非就是胡锦涛和江泽民政治集团控制的中纪委，抓一个，习近平再提拔一个自己人。三中全会之前提拔10个官员的有七八个是习近平的人。
习近平已经彻底丧失了人事大权
三中全会之后习近平已经彻底丧失了人事权。这就是两面夹击，一方面，中纪委继续抓习近平派系的官员。另外一方面，提拔的官员一个习近平派系的一个都没有。习近平已经彻底丧失了人事大权。
即便这样也是百足之虫，死而不僵。毕竟习近平当了12年总书记。上上下下全都是习近平的人。全都占据了关键的岗位。所以好多人干脆不抓了，来不及了，直接免职。萝卜快了不洗泥，杀人都嫌太慢，效率太低。每个职位退休年龄不一样，正部级是65岁退休，副部级是60岁退休。省委副书记和中将和副部级国家局是63岁退休。这些人都是提前两三年退休，还有提前5年，提前7年退休。都是习近平的人。
尤其是这个景俊海，我都分析过了，这就是朱镕基和习近平的人。景俊海被胡锦涛赶回家去，赶到了二线人大的日期也很特殊，2024年6月28日，也就是说，胡锦涛发动军事政变的事件在2024年6月28日之前。军事政变就是6月发生，具体是哪一天我也不知道。推测是6月19日，延安政治工作会议之后。就把他们都抓了，一锅端一个也没走得了。
就根据这些事件往回推测就行了。胡锦涛重掌大权之后，先把景俊海就处理了，可见他多恨景俊海。我不知道景俊海怎么得罪胡锦涛的，立马就把景俊海赶回家去了。这景俊海3个月之后，还能给安排到人大去够神的。包括这个丁向群都是被赶下台的。其实丁向群也是到年龄了。59岁半，还给安排到国企去当老总。国企的老总能干到63岁再退休。所以还是有习近平的人安排到二线的国企，人大，政协。都不安排就是狗急跳墙了。所以我就没有统计国企。
现在进度在哪里呢。这不好说。首先这120个官员里面还有副省长和国家部委的。我可以只统计一个省委常委的版本，就是把省委常委单独列出来。省委常委的人数比较确定，中国就是31个省。每个省的省委常委满编就是13个人。满编是402个人。实际大概有380个人。
我们划定这380个人的范围，缩小范围，更容易看的清楚。当然这也都是估计。除非把这380个人全部扒一遍。
我大概估计原来习近平省委常委这380个人有230个人，非习近平派系的胡锦涛和江泽民政治集团有150个人。三中全会之后如果8月开始算，现在是7个月了。换掉了六七十个人。平均一个月能换9个人或者10个人。就是快的话还需要4个月，慢的话还需要7个月。
基本就要开四中全会了。胡温他们也不知道未来会发生什么。打个比方，为什么要换到120个人，为什么不是100个人。这个没有标准。这就是感觉。到底要换到多少人足够，没有人知道。这个就是感觉。把习近平的人换下去的越多，胡温和江泽民的人上去的越多。就是最后气氛烘托到那里。习近平不下也不行了。
就是胡温和江泽民政治集团的人上去的越来越多。这是两个政治集团，是集团的利益，不仅仅是个人的利益。最后就是反习派的势力越来越强，习近平已经成为他们的绊脚石了。最后他们就是胃口越来越大，习近平最后剩下的100个省委常委也要给吃掉。最后就会嫌弃习近平碍事，就把习近平彻底赶下台了。大概就是这样的趋势，实力此消彼长。最后气氛烘托到那里了。上上下下习近平派系的官员越来越少了，习近平不下也不行了。我觉得他们的目的，就是希望这个过程越顺利越好。就是让习近平自然而然就下去了。习近平变成光杆司令，就不会有什么反抗了。
现在上来的人，就没有习近平的人。我们看西藏常务副主席旦巴。2005年7月 – 2006年3月，36岁的旦巴任西藏自治区党委统战部政策理论研究室副主任。
2006年3月 – 2009年11月，37岁的旦巴任西藏自治区党委统战部政策理论研究室主任 当时的西藏统战部长是巴桑顿珠 (2002年12月 – 2006年9月）。
我们看西藏的统战部长，洛桑江村和齐扎拉都是习近平的人。旦巴的时间线完美的落到了巴桑顿珠的任期里面。旦巴的西藏统战部研究室副主任，主任都是在巴桑顿珠任期提拔的。旦巴统战部副部长，已经不是洛桑江村这个统战部长能够提拔的，要西藏自治区党委才有权限提拔。
我没有研究是谁提拔的。但是当时的西藏党委书记张庆黎和西藏主席向巴平措都是胡锦涛的人吧。西藏胡锦涛的人比较多，但也不是全家桶。就西藏一半的官员是胡锦涛的人，另外一半不是。
我们看巴桑顿珠也挺抽象的。2003年3月4日下午近三点，北京友谊宾馆贵宾楼多功能厅内， 一百多位身穿绚丽民族服装、来自56个民族的全国政协委员们，静静 地等待着一个时刻：下午3点，中共中央政治局常委、中共中央总书 记胡锦涛将到这里和大家一起共商国是。 差10分3点，会议厅南门口突然发出一阵热烈的掌声———总书 记来了！委员们纷纷站起来，迎接总书记。
在中共中央政治局常委、全国政协十届一次会议主席团常务主席 会议主持人贾庆林的陪同下，胡锦涛总书记微笑着走进会议厅。他走 到委员面前，和委员们握手寒暄当总书记 来到曾在西藏自治区组织部工作的藏族委员巴桑顿珠身边时，巴桑顿 珠一边敬献哈达，一边问：“总书记，您还认识我吗？”总书记微笑着回答：“当然认识。”
这个巴桑顿珠居然问胡锦涛说，你还认识我吗？胡锦涛说，我当然认识。这个巴桑顿珠有点装叉，倚老卖老的感觉。
我们看巴桑顿珠的时间线，胡锦涛到西藏的时候巴桑顿珠是西藏组织部组织处的副处长。在胡锦涛的任期之内，巴桑顿珠升任处长，西藏组织部的副部长。尤其西藏组织部的副部长，那只能是西藏党委提拔，当时的党委的一把手就是胡锦涛，党委书记。胡锦涛亲自提拔巴桑顿珠，巴桑顿珠还能问胡锦涛说，你还认识我吗？旦巴是巴桑顿珠提拔的，巴桑顿珠是胡锦涛提拔的。
李乐成担任工信部长，传言，辽宁省委副书记，沈阳市委书记王新伟要担任辽宁省长，但是还没有官宣。
王新伟我说过了。王新伟最早在河南省平顶山市是田纪云侄子田承忠提拔的，田承忠是田纪云三弟田纪震的儿子。赵家天下田家党，赵紫阳的班底全都是田纪云的人。最吊诡的就是胡锦涛的班底全部都是赵紫阳的班底。
路线都是假的，人事才是真的
胡锦涛从人事上说，完全继承了赵紫阳的班底。提拔的人都是赵紫阳的人。但是路线呢，赵紫阳号称中国的戈尔巴切夫，但是胡锦涛呢看着也不像啊。只能说把赵紫阳吹的太猛了。他不是中国的戈尔巴乔夫。工信部长李乐成也是一样的，提拔王新伟那个田承忠，赵紫阳头号马仔田纪云的之子。田承忠后来去湖北当副省长。
李乐成就是湖北官员的。李乐成到辽宁，辽宁是李克强当过省长的地方。2021年10月，李乐成任辽宁省长。当时辽宁省政府秘书长是徐岩（2019年1月 – 2023年1月），徐岩是唐一军任命的，刘宁接替唐一军担任辽宁省长后并未更换，李乐成接替刘宁担任辽宁省长继续使用徐岩1年3个月后，更换为冯守权（2023年1月 – ）。截至目前，冯守权担任李乐成大秘2年1个月。
李乐成的大秘冯守权我不太确定。冯守权的上级是陈政高和曾维。曾维曾经是李克强的大秘。当然也当过闻世震的大秘。我不知道曾维是李克强的人还是闻世震的人。闻世震是江泽民的人。江泽民指使闻世震和薄熙来斗的，政治斗争。江泽民要和陈云薄一波争夺权力。所以这个李乐成就不是习近平的人，要么是李克强的人，要么是江泽民的人。习近平的人就上不去。
我们看一下贸易战
这名网友说，很简单。一年前广东罐头厂的鹰金钱豆豉鲮鱼罐头去年是11美元四听。上个月是八美元四听。美国涨得多的东西恰恰是美国本土生产的东西。因为工资涨了。真的不要拍拍脑袋开口就来了。我朋友的公司已经被要求降低10%价格来应对关税了他的利润也就15%
目前美国对中国加权平均关税达到39.2%[19.2%+10%+10%]，中国出口企业又死一大片。就是中国拼命宣传加10%的关税，实际是加到了40%。温水煮青蛙，先加20%又加了两个10%，一共是40%，不是10%
英文翻译
Li Lecheng replaced Jin Zhuanglong as Minister of Industry and Information Technology, and Li Keqiang’s henchmen took over. Xi Jinping’s henchmen were dismissed. When will the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee be held? The tariffs imposed on China in the trade war are 40%, not 10%
Hello everyone, Liaoning Governor Li Lecheng replaced Jin Zhuanglong as Minister of Industry and Information Technology. I have long said that Jin Zhuanglong will be arrested, but he has not been arrested yet, and it is still Comrade Jin Zhuanglong. But it doesn’t matter, Comrade Jin Zhuanglong’s political life is over. I predicted on September 11, 2024 that Zhu Zhisong, a member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, would be arrested, which is very unfortunate.
On November 26, 2024, two and a half months later, Zhu Zhisong was arrested, and condolences were expressed to him. This thing is not something that can be arrested just by saying it. We are bragging here, saying that it is not a matter of one sentence to arrest someone? In actual operation, it may not be that simple. Yesterday, I said that if it was Xi Jinping who said to arrest whoever, then Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin’s people would have been arrested by Xi Jinping long ago.
Now the reverse is the same. He is not Hu Jintao or Wen Jiabao, who can arrest anyone he wants. Behind every piece of news about arrests, there is a lot of work that has been done. Go to the bank to check their accounts, investigate them, and there is a lot of work to do. Enough black materials have been collected. He has to go to jail even if he doesn’t want to. If Jin Zhuanglong doesn’t go to jail, he will be arrested. Jin Zhuanglong will have no choice at that time. Bang, the materials are here. What if he doesn’t get out of here after embezzling so much money? There must be evidence. Hu and Wen’s lackeys are all corrupt officials. There is no official in the Communist Party who is not a corrupt official. But if Hu and Wen are in power now, they will definitely not allow their own people to be investigated. It’s all the same routine. There is no anti-corruption in China, only political struggle in the name of anti-corruption.
We can just follow this timeline. Zhu Zhisong, Jin Zhuanglong and Ying Yong should be on the same line. I said Zhu Zhisong would be arrested, but he was arrested two and a half months later. Jin Zhuanglong was dismissed half a year later. It took four months. According to this timeline, even if Ying Yong is to be arrested, it will take at least another four months. Finally, the black material and the handle are there. Ying Yong has no choice but to resign or be arrested. But this is definitely selective law enforcement. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is not controlled by Xi Jinping now. Li Xi and Liu Jinguo have the final say in the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. In the past, Xi Jinping had the final say because Wang Qishan, the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Xi Jinping are from the same family.
After the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, none of Xi Jinping’s people have come to power. You can see that anyone can come to power, including Ling Jihua, Zhou Yongkang, Sun Zhengcai, and Huang Xingguo, who are all the disciples of officials arrested by Xi Jinping. To put it bluntly, they are all anti-Xi people. Deng Pufang’s chief secretary can come to power. Deng Pufang’s chairman of the Disabled Persons’ Federation, or honorary chairman, was removed by Xi Jinping. Yang Xiaodu, who succeeded Deng Pufang, is Xi Jinping’s man. He was the second in command of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection before. Only the first and second in command can have the final say. In the past, Xi Jinping could control the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection because Wang Qishan was the first in command and Yang Xiaodu was the second in command.
Li Xi and Liu Jinguo, the top two leaders of the CCDI, are not Xi Jinping’s people. Otherwise, Xi Jinping could still arrest Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin’s people. Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin were afraid of being arrested by Wang Qishan and Yang Xiaodu, so they tried every means to control the CCDI. There is a saying in the United States that the Ministry of Justice is weaponized as a tool for political struggle. The weaponization of the CCDI in China as a tool for political struggle started with Wang Qishan. You can see that Liu Jinguo, the second-in-command of the CCDI, was inserted into the CCDI during Wang Qishan’s term. At that time, Jiang Zemin had been arrested by Wang Qishan, so Liu Jinguo was arranged to join the CCDI.
This is mutual. If you, Xi Jinping, can play with the CCDI, I, Jiang Zemin, can also play with the CCDI. Since you can use the CCDI to arrest people, I can also use the CCDI to arrest people. The CCDI is just a tool for political struggle. The CCDI can only influence 10%, at most 20% of the personnel layout. The Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee has the final say. Therefore, even if Xi Jinping did not control the CCDI before the Third Plenary Session, he could basically stabilize the overall situation. It was nothing more than the CCDI controlled by Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin’s political group. If Xi Jinping arrested one person, he would promote another person of his own. Seven or eight of the 10 officials promoted before the Third Plenary Session were Xi Jinping’s people.
Xi Jinping has completely lost his power over personnel
After the Third Plenary Session, Xi Jinping has completely lost his power over personnel. This is a two-sided attack. On the one hand, the CCDI continues to arrest officials from Xi Jinping’s faction. On the other hand, none of the officials promoted are from Xi Jinping’s faction. Xi Jinping has completely lost his power over personnel.
Even so, it is still a centipede, dead but not stiff. After all, Xi Jinping has been the general secretary for 12 years. From top to bottom, it is all Xi Jinping’s people. All of them occupy key positions. So many people are simply not arrested, it is too late, and they are directly dismissed. The quick carrot does not wash the mud, and the killing is too slow, and the efficiency is too low. The retirement age for each position is different. Ministerial level retires at 65, and vice-ministerial level retires at 60. Deputy secretaries of provincial committees, lieutenant generals, and vice-ministerial level state bureaus retire at 63. These people retire two or three years in advance, and some retire five or seven years in advance. They are all Xi Jinping’s people.
Especially Jing Junhai, I have analyzed it all. This is Zhu Rongji and Xi Jinping’s people. Jing Junhai was driven back home by Hu Jintao. The date of the second-line National People’s Congress was also very special, June 28, 2024, which means that Hu Jintao launched a military coup before June 28, 2024. The military coup happened in June, and I don’t know the specific date. It is speculated that it was June 19, after the Yan’an Political Work Conference. They were all arrested, and none of them could escape.
Just speculate back based on these events. After Hu Jintao regained power, he dealt with Jing Junhai first, which shows how much he hated Jing Junhai. I don’t know how Jing Junhai offended Hu Jintao, and he was immediately sent home. Three months later, Jing Junhai was arranged to the National People’s Congress. Including Ding Xiangqun, who was driven out. In fact, Ding Xiangqun was also old enough. At the age of 59 and a half, he was arranged to be the general manager of a state-owned enterprise. The general manager of a state-owned enterprise can retire at the age of 63. So there are still people of Xi Jinping arranged to second-tier state-owned enterprises, the National People’s Congress, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. If they are not arranged, they are desperate. So I did not count the state-owned enterprises.
Where is the progress now? It’s hard to say. First of all, there are deputy provincial governors and national ministries and commissions among these 120 officials. I can only count one version of the provincial party committee standing committee, that is, list the provincial party committee standing committee members separately. The number of provincial party committee standing committee members is relatively certain. China has 31 provinces. The full number of provincial party committee standing committee members in each province is 13 people. The full number is 402 people. In fact, there are about 380 people.
We have narrowed the scope of these 380 people and made it easier to see clearly. Of course, this is all an estimate. Unless all these 380 people are dug up.
I roughly estimate that there are 230 people among the 380 members of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee of Xi Jinping, and 150 people from the political group of Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin who are not from Xi Jinping’s faction. If we start counting from August after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee, it has been 7 months now. Sixty or 70 people have been replaced. On average, 9 or 10 people can be replaced every month. If it is fast, it will take another 4 months, and if it is slow, it will take another 7 months.
The Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee is basically about to be held. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao don’t know what will happen in the future. For example, why do we need to replace 120 people, why not 100 people? There is no standard for this. This is just a feeling. No one knows how many people should be replaced. This is a feeling. The more people who replace Xi Jinping’s people, the more people who are promoted by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Jiang Zemin. The atmosphere is so heated in the end. Xi Jinping has to step down.
That is, more and more people from Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Jiang Zemin’s political group are promoted. These are two political groups, and it is the group’s interests, not just the individual’s. In the end, the anti-Xi faction is getting stronger and stronger, and Xi Jinping has become a stumbling block for them. In the end, their appetite is getting bigger and bigger, and they will also eat up the last 100 provincial party committee members left by Xi Jinping. In the end, they will dislike Xi Jinping for being in the way, and will completely drive Xi Jinping out of office. This is probably the trend, with one side gaining power while the other loses. In the end, the atmosphere is set there. There are fewer and fewer officials from Xi Jinping’s faction, and Xi Jinping has to step down. I think their goal is to hope that this process will be as smooth as possible. Just let Xi Jinping step down naturally. Xi Jinping will become a commander without troops, and there will be no resistance.
Now, there are no people who are Xi Jinping’s people who come up. Let’s look at Danba, the executive vice chairman of Tibet. From July 2005 to March 2006, Danba, 36, served as deputy director of the Policy Theory Research Office of the United Front Work Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee.
From March 2006 to November 2009, 37-year-old Danba served as the director of the Policy and Theory Research Office of the United Front Work Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee. The then head of the United Front Work Department of Tibet was Basang Dunzhu (December 2002-September 2006).
Let’s look at the heads of the United Front Work Department of Tibet. Both Losang Jiangcun and Qi Zhala are Xi Jinping’s people. Danba’s timeline perfectly falls within Basang Dunzhu’s term. Danba’s deputy director and director of the Research Office of the Tibet United Front Work Department were promoted during Basang Dunzhu’s term. Danba’s deputy director of the United Front Work Department was no longer someone that Losang Jiangcun, the head of the United Front Work Department, could promote. Only the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee had the authority to promote him.
I didn’t study who promoted him. But Zhang Qingli, the then secretary of the Tibet Party Committee, and Xiangba Phuntsok, the chairman of Tibet, were both Hu Jintao’s people. There are many Hu Jintao’s people in Tibet, but not all of them. Half of the officials in Tibet are Hu Jintao’s people, and the other half are not.
Let’s look at Basang Dunzhu, which is also quite abstract. At nearly 3:00 p.m. on March 4, 2003, in the multifunctional hall of the VIP building of Beijing Friendship Hotel, more than 100 members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference from 56 ethnic groups, wearing gorgeous ethnic costumes, quietly waited for a moment: at 3:00 p.m., Hu Jintao, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, would come here to discuss state affairs with everyone. At 10 minutes to 3:00, a burst of warm applause suddenly broke out at the south entrance of the conference hall—the General Secretary is coming! The members stood up one after another to welcome the General Secretary.
Accompanied by Jia Qinglin, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, executive chairman of the presidium of the 10th session of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and moderator of the meeting, General Secretary Hu Jintao walked into the conference hall with a smile. He walked up to the members and shook hands with them. When the General Secretary came to Basang Donzhu, a Tibetan member who had worked in the Organization Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Basang Donzhu presented a khata and asked, “General Secretary, do you still recognize me?” The General Secretary smiled and replied, “Of course I do.”
This Basang Donzhu actually asked Hu Jintao, do you still recognize me? Hu Jintao said, of course I know him. This Basang Donzhu is a bit pretentious, and he seems to be taking advantage of his seniority.
Let’s look at Basang Donzhu’s timeline. When Hu Jintao arrived in Tibet, Basang Donzhu was the deputy director of the Organization Department of the Tibet Organization Department. During Hu Jintao’s term, Basang Donzhu was promoted to director and deputy director of the Tibet Organization Department. Especially the deputy director of the Tibet Organization Department, that can only be promoted by the Tibet Party Committee. The top leader of the Party Committee at that time was Hu Jintao, the Party Committee Secretary. Hu Jintao personally promoted Basang Donzhu, and Basang Donzhu could still ask Hu Jintao, do you still know me? Danba was promoted by Basang Donzhu, and Basang Donzhu was promoted by Hu Jintao.
Li Lecheng served as the Minister of Industry and Information Technology. It is rumored that Wang Xinwei, the deputy secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee and the secretary of the Shenyang Municipal Party Committee, will serve as the governor of Liaoning Province, but it has not been officially announced yet.
I have talked about Wang Xinwei. Wang Xinwei was first promoted by Tian Chengzhong, the nephew of Tian Jiyun, in Pingdingshan City, Henan Province. Tian Chengzhong is the son of Tian Jiyun’s third brother Tian Jizhen. The Zhao family ruled the country, but the Tian family ruled the party. Zhao Ziyang’s team was all Tian Jiyun’s people. The most bizarre thing is that Hu Jintao’s team was all Zhao Ziyang’s team.
The lines are all fake, but the personnel are real
Hu Jintao completely inherited Zhao Ziyang’s team in terms of personnel. The people he promoted were all Zhao Ziyang’s people. But as for the line, Zhao Ziyang was known as China’s Gorbachev, but Hu Jintao didn’t look like that. It can only be said that Zhao Ziyang was praised too much. He is not China’s Gorbachev. The Minister of Industry and Information Technology Li Lecheng is the same. He promoted Wang Xinwei’s Tian Chengzhong, the son of Zhao Ziyang’s top henchman Tian Jiyun. Tian Chengzhong later went to Hubei to serve as vice governor.
Li Lecheng is a Hubei official. Li Lecheng went to Liaoning, where Li Keqiang was governor. In October 2021, Li Lecheng became governor of Liaoning. At that time, the Secretary General of Liaoning Provincial Government was Xu Yan (January 2019 – January 2023). Xu Yan was appointed by Tang Yijun. Liu Ning did not change after he succeeded Tang Yijun as the Governor of Liaoning Province. Li Lecheng continued to use Xu Yan for 1 year and 3 months after he succeeded Liu Ning as the Governor of Liaoning Province, and then replaced him with Feng Shouquan (January 2023 – ). As of now, Feng Shouquan has served as Li Lecheng’s chief secretary for 2 years and 1 month.
I am not sure about Feng Shouquan, Li Lecheng’s chief secretary. Feng Shouquan’s superiors are Chen Zhenggao and Zeng Wei. Zeng Wei used to be Li Keqiang’s chief secretary. Of course, he also served as Wen Shizhen’s chief secretary. I don’t know whether Zeng Wei is Li Keqiang’s person or Wen Shizhen’s person. Wen Shizhen is Jiang Zemin’s person. Jiang Zemin instructed Wen Shizhen to fight with Bo Xilai, a political struggle. Jiang Zemin wants to compete for power with Chen Yun and Bo Yibo. So this Li Lecheng is not Xi Jinping’s person, either Li Keqiang’s person or Jiang Zemin’s person. Xi Jinping’s people can’t get promoted.
Let’s look at the trade war
This netizen said, it’s very simple. A year ago, the price of four cans of Eagle Gold Coins and Black Bean Sauce produced by Guangdong Cannery was $11. Last month, it was $8. The things that have increased the most in the United States are precisely the things produced in the United States. Because wages have increased. Don’t just pat your head and ask for it. My friend’s company has been asked to reduce prices by 10% to cope with tariffs, and his profit is only 15%
Currently, the weighted average tariff of the United States on China has reached 39.2% [19.2%+10%+10%], and a large number of Chinese export companies have died. It’s just that China desperately promoted the 10% tariff increase, but it actually increased to 40%. Boiling a frog in warm water, first adding 20% and then adding two 10%, a total of 40%, not 10%