揭秘:文革中周恩来亲自指挥的两次军事行动

编者按:周恩来在文革中指挥的可不止两次,所有的研究都表明,文革中军队是由周恩来直接指挥调动的。文革就是周恩来在毛泽东直接指挥下搞得,后来因为陈云成为邓小平时代的二把手,为了抬高自己,陈云洗白周恩来的。陈云把周恩来吹的,周恩来的老婆邓颖超都不好意思了。邓颖超说,他这个人你们不是不了解,路线对了,他就对了,路线错了,他就错了。你们那样说,那样搞,没法向历史向后人交代么。周恩来的老婆邓颖超向陈云说,你不要再篡改历史了。现在的习近平正是继承了周恩来陈云李鹏朱镕基这一派的政治势力。

“文革”开始后的1967年2月15日,原属于北京军区的中国人民解放军陆军第二十一军(现为七十六军)奉中央军委命令转隶兰州军区,由山西进驻陕西,执行“三支两军”(支左、支工、支农和军管、军训)任务,军部驻地也由太原市移至西安市。

1967年2月22日夜,军部突然接到国务院总理办公室打来的电话,要求军长胡炜于1967年2月23日晨乘坐专机前往北京领受任务。

次日(1967年2月23日)上午,胡炜乘坐国务院派去的专机抵达北京。下了飞机,便驱车前往京西宾馆。此时,中央军委扩大会议正在京西宾馆举行。胡炜由工作人员领进会场后,看到周恩来总理正在讲话。秘书走到周恩来的身边,低声向他作了报告,周恩来朝胡炜看了一眼,继续他的讲话。胡炜找了一个空座位坐了下来。

大约11点钟,周恩来讲完话,会议也就结束了。周恩来站起身,径直朝胡炜走来。胡炜双腿并立,腰杆挺直,以标准的军人姿态向总理敬了一个军礼。看样子,周恩来对于陕西省的局势比较焦虑,也没有另找一个场合与胡炜谈话,直接给他布置了任务。

周恩来说:“西安现在很乱,大游行、大辩论、大喇叭。西安两派都是革命群众组织。你们部队到达西安以后,要尽力稳定形势。你们要做工作,促使两派群众组织联合起来。现在,西安两派群众组织的负责人都在北京,你先和他们见见面,了解一下情况,做做工作。”

遵照总理的指示,第二天,胡炜先后前往教育部招待所和西藏自治区驻京办事处两地,分别与住在那里的西安地区两派群众组织头头见面,和他们谈话,了解情况。

1967年3月2日下午,周恩来在中南海国务院会议室接见了胡炜以及陕西省军区副司令员王明坤、兰州军区空军副政委刘镇、西安地区群众组织头头40余人。

会议一开始,周恩来就介绍说:“为了稳定形势,中央决定派二十一军(现为七十六军)到陕西省执行‘支左’任务。今天二十一军(现为七十六军)军长胡炜同志也到会了。”

胡炜站起身,向周恩来和大家敬了一个礼。

周恩来接着介绍道:“胡炜同志能打仗,能做思想政治工作,能文能武,是我军年轻的军长。二十一军(现为七十六军)到陕西省以后,你们两派群众组织都要支持军队的工作。”

周恩来的这一番话,显然是为军队着想,为军队进驻陕西以后能够顺利地开展工作而创造一个比较好的条件和环境。(屁,只能说明胡炜是周恩来的马仔。)

谈到陕西省的形势时,周恩来目光炯炯,扫视着在座的40多位群众组织头头。他虽然语气温和,娓娓而谈,但言语之中又透着几分严厉:“你们把西安的形势搞得这么乱,光讲自己正确,光想压制别人,这算搞什么‘文化大革命’嘛!两派群众组织要整风,大学要搞军训。两派群众组织都要克服自己的问题,要联合起来,抓革命,促生产,不能让生产停顿!”

接见结束以后,胡炜回到了京西宾馆住处。深夜12点钟,他正准备休息,电话铃突然响了。电话是国务院总理办公室打来的,要他马上去人民大会堂,说总理要再次接见他。胡炜不敢怠慢,立刻穿好军装,动身前往人民大会堂。

到了人民大会堂,胡炜看到,除了他,一道参加接见的还有陕西省军区副司令员王明坤、兰州军区空军副政委刘镇、中共陕西省委第一书记霍士廉、中共西安市委书记薛焰。(说明这几个人可能都是周恩来马仔

周恩来先是问了陕西省的情况,接着作了指示,主要内容是:现在地方党政机构已经瘫痪,军队的主要领导同志要组成统一的“支左”领导机构,暂时把全省的工作管起来。要稳定形势,促进联合,抓好生产。军队的负责干部要和群众组织协商,做好群众组织的工作。让霍士廉、薛焰和其他一些省、市领导干部出来工作,一面接受批评,一面抓好生产。

说到霍士廉、薛焰等领导干部时,周恩来语重心长地说:“你们不能陷到任何一派那里去,陷到那里,不好工作。”(周恩来的意思是让霍士廉、薛焰不能投靠到毛泽东那一派,继续站在我周恩来这一派)

几天内受到周恩来三次接见,(再次证明胡炜是周恩来马仔胡炜觉得总理的主要目的就是想统一驻陕部队(包括省军区、野战军、空军等)领导干部的思想认识,统一地方和部队领导干部的思想认识,齐心协力,一道做好群众组织的工作,以利于陕西省局势的稳定,迅速恢复生产。(周恩来想护住自己在陕西的势力范围)胡炜和参加接见的陕西省党、政、军主要领导干部,对于总理的指示都表示拥护,并表示坚决贯彻落实。(再次证明胡炜等人是周恩来的马仔)

江青“文攻武卫”和王力、关锋“揪军内一小撮”社论的鼓动下,(证明这些人是毛泽东马仔)渐趋稳定的形势重新紧张。一造反派阴谋抢劫解放军武器库,周恩来向胡炜下命令:“你要派部队加以保护。必要时,可以开枪!”证明武斗是周恩来挑起来的。

胡炜军长所辖部队,是中央军委专门派赴陕西省执行“三支两军”任务的,(所谓的中央军委,其实是周恩来)理所当然的要全力以赴投入此项工作。他们进驻陕西省以后,抽调大批干部、战士组成了几百个“毛泽东思想宣传队”,(打着毛泽东的旗号,反对毛泽东,扛着红旗反红旗)进驻厂矿和一些企事业单位。同时,他们把西安交通大学等4所院校的学生集中起来,进行为期1个月的军训。这样,把学生稳定在校园里,减少了对社会的冲击和干扰。通过军训,也加深了学生和解放军指战员之间的沟通和了解,加深了彼此之间的感情。同时,由于陕西省党、政、军主要领导干部的思想认识比较统一,工作得当,陕西省的形势很快就稳定了下来。(周恩来控制陕西局面,重新掌权

1967年5月下旬,陕西省军区司令员黄经耀胡炜奉命前往北京,向周恩来和中央文革小组汇报工作。

1967年5月24晚,周恩来在钓鱼台16号楼中央文革碰头会办公室接见了黄经耀、胡炜二人。同时参加接见的还有陈伯达、康生、王力、关锋、戚本禹等中央文革小组的成员。

听取了黄经耀、胡炜二人的汇报后,周恩来感到很满意。(周恩来掌权了,所以满意)他首先肯定了陕西省这一段的工作,指示他们要进一步做好两派群众组织的工作,促使两派联合起来,(周恩来想让两派都听自己的)巩固和发展已取得的成果。他同时还特别指出:“资产阶级派性是很顽固的,你们要提高警惕,防止派性膨胀,防止形势出现反复。”

许多善良的同志都以为,陕西省就此可以风平浪静了,不管运动怎么搞,有野战军的一个军在陕西坐镇,至少不会出什么大的乱子。但他们没料到,不久后,江青关于“文攻武卫”的讲话和王力、关锋为《红旗》杂志起草修改的关于“揪军内一小撮”的社论,在神州大地又掀起了一股股恶浪。

1967年7月22日,江青在接见河南省造反派代表团时说:“我们不能太天真烂漫。当挑起武斗的一小撮人,他们拿起武器打你们的时候,革命群众可以拿起武器自卫。在双方达成停止武斗的协议以后,他们仍然不把武器收起来的话,你们自卫的武器就不能放下!我记得好像就是河南的一个革命组织提出了这样的口号,叫作‘文攻武卫’。这个口号是对的。我们坚持毛主席提出的文斗,坚决反对武斗,这是第一条。……但是还有第二条,不能天真烂漫。当他们不放下武器,拿着枪支、长矛、大刀对着你们,你们就放下武器,这是不对的,你们要吃亏的……”

第二天,《文汇报》披露了江青这个讲话的精神。这样,全国各地的造反派好像听到了冲锋号,都打着“文攻武卫”的旗号招摇过市,武斗愈演愈烈,逐步升级。

1967年8月1日,《红旗》杂志发表了由王力、关锋等起草的社论《无产阶级必须牢牢掌握枪杆子——纪念中国人民解放军建军40周年》。社论说:“我们必须进一步开展革命的大批判,把党内和军内一小撮走资本主义道路的当权派彻底干净地扫进垃圾堆里去。只有这样,才能防止资本主义复辟。……目前,全国正在掀起一个对党内、军内最大的一小撮走资本主义道路当权派的大批判运动,这是斗争的大方向。”

王力、关锋起草的这篇社论,影响也十分恶劣。社论发表后,全国各地的群众组织纷纷把斗争的矛头指向了解放军,贴出了“揪军内一小撮”的大字报,冲击解放军军营,殴打部队干部战士,抢劫枪支弹药,甚至公然抢劫解放军的武器弹药库。

1967年8月5日,也就是王力、关锋“揪军内一小撮”社论发表的第四天,西安市的街头就贴出了“揪军内一小撮”的大字报和大幅标语,赫然入目,耸人听闻。一派群众组织动员了数万人上街游行示威,在部队门前静坐。而与其对立的另一派群众组织也动员了数万人上街游行,(一派是毛泽东,一派是周恩来)并高喊口号:“反军乱军,绝无好下场!”

原本矛盾已经得到缓解的西安市两派群众组织,转瞬间就怒目而视,变得不共戴天,水火不容。两派的矛盾逐步激化,并最终于1967年9月2日发生了一起较大规模的武斗事件。幸亏解放军官兵及时赶到武斗现场,才避免了更大的伤亡。别信共产党洗脑的谎言,就是周恩来在拉偏架

1967年9月4日,设在西安市的军部总机突然接到了一个来自北京的电话,是国务院总理办公室打来的,说总理要胡炜军长接电话。

胡炜拿起话筒,听到了总理那熟悉的声音。周恩来告诉胡炜:西安市有一派群众组织离开了西安,窜到陕西省某地的解放军武器库附近一带,与当地的造反派组织纠集在一起,企图抢劫那里的武器弹药。

介绍完情况,周恩来以一种命令的口吻说道:“胡炜同志,你要派部队严加保护。必要时,可以开枪!”

如同在战争年代接受战斗任务一样,胡炜双腿并拢,笔直挺立。他手持话筒,操着浓重的河南口音斩钉截铁地说:“请总理放心,我们坚决执行总理的命令,保证完成任务!”

造反派武斗升级,由大刀、长矛发展到动用真枪、真炮。中央颁布命令:解放军在遇到特殊情况时,“有权自卫反击”。西安市造反派抢劫武器弹药库的企图未能得逞

在采访中,当听胡炜将军说周恩来总理曾经亲自向他下达过“可以开枪”的命令时,笔者感到非常惊讶。这种极为罕见的现象,不仅仅是笔者,恐怕就连长期从事党史研究工作的同志也是闻所未闻的。那么,究竟是什么万不得已的原因促使周恩来用了如此严厉的措词呢?为了搞清楚这一事件的历史背景,笔者查阅了很多相关的资料,并作了大量调查。

在“文化大革命” 中,全国各地的武斗大致可以分为两个时期:一、武斗初期。造反派使用的武器一般是砖头、棍棒、大刀、长矛等,尚属冷兵器时期;二、武斗进行到一定的阶段。此阶段,各地对立的武斗队都想置对方于死地,都觉得原先那么打不过瘾,于是都想方设法去搞武器装备。

为了弄到真枪真炮,他们首先把目光投向了基层的人民武装部和民兵组织。20世纪60年代,我国中型以上的国营工厂、农村的人民公社都设有人民武装部和民兵组织,并配备了一定数量的武器弹药。所以,最先遭到“造反派”抢劫的是这些基层人民武装部和民兵组织的武器弹药。

当江青“文攻武卫”的讲话和王力、关锋“揪军内一小撮”的社论出笼之后,造反派就开始公然抢劫所在地军分区、省军区、解放军部队的武器弹药。

1967年8月9日,浙江省军区军械一库、二库的武器弹药先后被造反派抢劫,被抢走的有迫击炮、轻重机枪、冲锋枪、手枪、信号枪、手榴弹、子弹等。1967年7月底至8月下旬,湖南省邵阳军分区、邵阳武装部的武器弹药库先后被造反派抢劫,被抢走的有各类枪支、迫击炮、手榴弹、子弹等。

针对这种严峻的局势,1967年9月5日,经毛泽东主席批准,中共中央、国务院、中央军委、中央文革小组联合发布了《关于不准抢夺人民解放军武器、装备和各种军用物资的命令》。命令重申:任何群众组织和任何人,不管是属于哪一派,不许以任何借口抢夺人民解放军的武器、弹药、装备、车辆、器材、物资;不许抢夺军火仓库、军用仓库和国防企业中的武器、弹药、装备、车辆、器材、物资;不许拦截火车、汽车、船舶上装载的武器弹药;不许外部人员进驻人民解放军的指挥机关。……今后如有违反此命令者,当以违犯国法论罪。当地驻军在执行上述命令时,首先要耐心地进行政治思想工作,讲清道理,进行劝阻。如劝阻无效,可对空鸣枪警告,令其撤回。在劝阻和警告无效时,可宣布这种抢夺是反革命行为,并采取措施对其少数的坏头头和肇事凶手予以逮捕法办。遇到这些人拒捕和抵抗时,人民解放军有权实行自卫反击。在海防、边防、沿海岛屿和国防、机要重地值勤的战士遇有人夺枪时,有权自卫反击。

命令是1967年9月5日颁布的,也就是说,周恩来总理于1967年9月4日向胡炜下达“必要时可以开枪”的命令时,“九五命令”已经决定颁布了。(这是周恩来做事滴水不漏的方式,其实是毛泽东和周恩来的政治斗争

我在采访胡炜将军时,他感慨万分地说:“周总理一向做事谨慎,轻易不会下达开枪令。这也是迫不得已啊!这个仓库的武器装备,可以装备几个步兵师,一旦被抢,整个陕西省就要大乱。不仅如此,还会威胁到邻近的省份。周总理给我打过电话之后,又叫国务院总理办公室的联络员吴斌同志给西安交通大学造反派头头打电话,责成他们立刻前去把准备抢夺武器弹药的人员全部撤回来。”1967年9月4日,胡炜接到周恩来的电话后,没有片刻迟疑,马上就向徐保俭团长下达了命令,要他亲自率领1个营的兵力,用最短的时间火速赶到该武器库,全面接管武器库的防务。

因为有总理“可以开枪”的命令,部队官兵也就不再畏手畏脚了。部队一到该武器库,徐保俭就命令战士们把武器库的防务全面接管过来,里里外外布置了好几道警戒线。他们架起机枪,子弹上膛,并向造反派发出警告:如果有谁胆敢跨越警戒线抢夺武器弹药,解放军就要执行周总理的命令,开枪制止!(早就想大开杀戒了

在解放军指战员强大的武力威慑下,西安市造反派抢劫该库武器弹药的企图没有得逞。

川陕两支武斗队汇合一处,意图夺取秦岭深处的一座国家战略储备油库。周恩来再次直接打电话给胡炜,命令他马上派部队赶去制止

1968年5月1日,西安市30万群众在市中心的新城广场隆重召开庆祝大会,正式宣告陕西省革命委员会成立。李瑞山任陕西省革命委员会主任,黄经耀、胡炜等11人任副主任。(所谓的革委会里面肯定是毛泽东和周恩来,两派的人都有

虽然省革命委员会成立了,但陕西省的形势依然十分严峻。其主要表现就是邻近的省份河南省、山西省、四川省、湖北省的武斗事件持续不断,受其影响,陕西省境内的恶性事件、大规模的武斗事件也在逐步升级,范围在不断扩大,并且有省内外造反派武斗人员互相勾结、互相支援之势。

1968年5月下旬的一天,西安市的军部总机再一次接到周恩来总理打来的电话。周恩来首先向胡炜通报了一个情况:四川省广元地区一支几百人的武斗队沿宝成铁路窜到了陕西省境内,与陕西省汉中地区的一支武斗队结成一伙,包围了秦岭山脉深处、宝成铁路附近的一座国家战略储备油库。接着,周恩来在电话里给胡炜下达了命令:“胡炜同志,你马上派部队去解决这个问题!”

放下电话,胡炜随即命令驻守在宝鸡市的解放军某师师长孙玉水率领两个营的兵力迅速前往秦岭山脉深处,保护国家的战略储备油库,制止和平息那里的事态。

由于情况紧急,孙玉水接到命令率部出发时,来不及对部队进行动员,拉起部队就走。

那天夜晚,正值下雨。夜色里,秦岭山脉黑云密布,雷电交加。随着一声声短促、急切的口令,6个连队的干部战士踏着四溅的雨水,跑步集合完毕。身穿雨衣的指战员一个个荷枪实弹,神色严峻,在宝鸡市陆续登上了卡车。随着一阵阵汽车发动机的轰鸣,一盏盏汽车前灯如同一把把利剑,劈开雨雾和夜幕,长蛇般急速向秦岭大山里进发。

部队出发之前,孙玉水已给驻守在陕西省略阳县的张文斌团长下达了命令,命令他率领两个连从略阳乘火车向油库所在地进发。两路部队,分进合击。

如今,孙玉水已经去世。我采访了现居住在西安市的张文斌。张文斌老团长离休前先后担任过汉中军分区副司令员、商洛军分区司令员。他回忆道:“秦岭大山里有一座大型油库,距离宝成铁路线还有七八公里,火车把油罐车拉到油库附近的一个火车站,再通过输油管道把油输送到油库里。那是从国家战略需要出发,60年代专门在三线大后方设置的。1968年5月下旬的一个晚上,孙玉水师长突然从宝鸡给我打来电话,命令我率领驻扎在略阳的两个连乘火车出发。两路部队,分进合击。当天夜里我就和略阳铁路部门联系,调来了一个火车头,在后面加挂了五六节车厢。秦岭的公路本来就不好走,那天晚上还下着大雨。孙玉水师长率领的部队走到凤县时,因为雨下得太大,山路泥泞,道路实在是不好走,不得不停顿了一下。孙师长在出发前,都没有时间对部队进行动员,他是在凤县对部队进行动员的。孙师长在动员时告诉干部战士们:今晚我们要到什么地方去,任务是什么,对大家提出了要求……离开宝鸡时,那6个连队糊里糊涂的,都不知道师长要带他们到什么地方去呢!”

第二天中午12时左右,孙玉水率领的6个连和张文斌率领的两个连几乎是同时抵达油库附近。孙玉水不顾长途行军的疲劳,指挥部队迅速控制了油库,把火车站和油库一带的几个山头都给占领了,占据了制高点,里里外外布置了几道警戒线。

来自四川广元、陕西汉中的两支武斗队,不知道从哪儿事先得到了消息,说是解放军派来了大批部队,昼夜兼程正在朝这里进发,便吓得逃之夭夭了。所以,解放军部队没有和他们发生正面接触和冲突。

英文翻译

Revealing the secrets: Two military operations that Zhou Enlai personally commanded during the Cultural Revolution
Editor’s note: Zhou Enlai commanded more than two times during the Cultural Revolution. All research shows that the army was commanded and mobilized by Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was carried out by Zhou Enlai under the direct command of Mao Zedong. Later, because Chen Yun became the second-in-command in the Deng Xiaoping era, in order to elevate himself, Chen Yun whitewashed Zhou Enlai. Chen Yun praised Zhou Enlai so much that Zhou Enlai’s wife Deng Yingchao was embarrassed. Deng Yingchao said, you don’t know him, if the line is right, he is right, if the line is wrong, he is wrong. You say that, do that, can’t you explain to history and future generations? The current Xi Jinping has inherited the political power of Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji.

On February 15, 1967, after the start of the Cultural Revolution, the 21st Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (now the 76th Army), which was originally under the Beijing Military Region, was transferred to the Lanzhou Military Region by order of the Central Military Commission. It moved from Shanxi to Shaanxi to carry out the “three supports and two armies” (supporting the left, supporting workers, supporting agriculture and military management, military training) tasks, and the military headquarters was also moved from Taiyuan to Xi’an.

On the night of February 22, 1967, the military headquarters suddenly received a call from the Premier’s Office of the State Council, requiring the army commander Hu Wei to take a special plane to Beijing on the morning of February 23, 1967 to receive the task.

The next morning (February 23, 1967), Hu Wei arrived in Beijing on a special plane sent by the State Council. After getting off the plane, he drove to the Jingxi Hotel. At this time, the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission was being held at the Jingxi Hotel. After Hu Wei was led into the venue by the staff, he saw Premier Zhou Enlai speaking. The secretary walked to Zhou Enlai and reported to him in a low voice. Zhou Enlai glanced at Hu Wei and continued his speech. Hu Wei found an empty seat and sat down.

At about 11 o’clock, Zhou Enlai finished his speech and the meeting ended. Zhou Enlai stood up and walked straight towards Hu Wei. Hu Wei stood with his legs together, his back straight, and saluted the Premier in a standard military posture. It seems that Zhou Enlai is quite anxious about the situation in Shaanxi Province. He did not find another occasion to talk to Hu Wei, but directly assigned him a task.

Zhou Enlai said: “Xi’an is very chaotic now, with big parades, big debates, and loud speakers. Both factions in Xi’an are revolutionary mass organizations. After your troops arrive in Xi’an, you must do your best to stabilize the situation. You have to do work to promote the unity of the two factions of mass organizations. Now, the leaders of the two factions of mass organizations in Xi’an are in Beijing. You should meet with them first, understand the situation, and do some work.”

According to the Premier’s instructions, the next day, Hu Wei went to the Ministry of Education Guesthouse and the Tibet Autonomous Region Office in Beijing, and met with the leaders of the two factions of mass organizations in Xi’an who lived there, talked with them, and understood the situation.

On the afternoon of March 2, 1967, Zhou Enlai met with Hu Wei, as well as Wang Mingkun, deputy commander of the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region, Liu Zhen, deputy political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region Air Force, and more than 40 leaders of mass organizations in Xi’an in the State Council meeting room in Zhongnanhai.

At the beginning of the meeting, Zhou Enlai introduced: “In order to stabilize the situation, the Central Committee decided to send the 21st Army (now the 76th Army) to Shaanxi Province to carry out the “support the left” mission. Today, Comrade Hu Wei, commander of the 21st Army (now the 76th Army), also attended the meeting.”

Hu Wei stood up and saluted Zhou Enlai and everyone.

Zhou Enlai then introduced: “Comrade Hu Wei can fight, do ideological and political work, and is both civil and military. He is a young commander of our army. After the 21st Army (now the 76th Army) arrives in Shaanxi Province, both of your mass organizations must support the work of the army.”

Zhou Enlai’s words were obviously for the sake of the army, to create better conditions and environment for the army to carry out its work smoothly after entering Shaanxi. (Bullshit, it only shows that Hu Wei is Zhou Enlai’s lackey.)

When talking about the situation in Shaanxi Province, Zhou Enlai looked at the more than 40 heads of mass organizations present. Although he spoke in a gentle tone, his words were also a bit harsh: “You have made the situation in Xi’an so chaotic. You only say that you are correct and only want to suppress others. What kind of “Cultural Revolution” is this! The two factions of mass organizations must rectify their work styles, and the university must conduct military training. Both factions of mass organizations must overcome their own problems, unite, grasp the revolution, promote production, and cannot let production stop!”

After the meeting, Hu Wei returned to his residence at the Jingxi Hotel. At 12 o’clock in the middle of the night, he was about to rest when the phone rang suddenly. The call was from the Premier’s Office of the State Council, asking him to go to the Great Hall of the People immediately, saying that the Premier wanted to meet him again. Hu Wei did not dare to neglect it, and immediately put on his military uniform and set off for the Great Hall of the People.

Arriving at the Great Hall of the People, Hu Wei saw that in addition to him, the meeting also included Wang Mingkun, deputy commander of the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region, Liu Zhen, deputy political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region Air Force, Huo Shilian, first secretary of the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Xue Yan, secretary of the Xi’an Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China. (This shows that these people may all be Zhou Enlai’s lackeys)

Zhou Enlai first asked about the situation in Shaanxi Province, and then gave instructions. The main content was: Now that the local party and government institutions have been paralyzed, the main leading comrades of the army should form a unified “support the left” leadership organization to temporarily manage the work of the entire province. It is necessary to stabilize the situation, promote unity, and do a good job in production. The responsible cadres of the army should consult with mass organizations and do a good job in mass organizations. Let Huo Shilian, Xue Yan and some other provincial and municipal leading cadres come out to work, accept criticism while doing a good job in production.

When talking about Huo Shilian, Xue Yan and other leading cadres, Zhou Enlai said earnestly: “You can’t fall into any faction. If you fall into it, it will be difficult to work.” (Zhou Enlai meant that Huo Shilian and Xue Yan could not join Mao Zedong’s faction and continue to stand on my side, Zhou Enlai)

Hu Wei was received by Zhou Enlai three times in a few days (once again proving that Hu Wei was Zhou Enlai’s lackey) Hu Wei felt that the Premier’s main purpose was to unify the ideological understanding of the leading cadres of the troops stationed in Shaanxi (including the provincial military region, field army, air force, etc.), unify the ideological understanding of the leading cadres of local and military forces, work together to do a good job in mass organization, so as to stabilize the situation in Shaanxi Province and quickly resume production. (Zhou Enlai wanted to protect his sphere of influence in Shaanxi) Hu Wei and the main leading cadres of the party, government and military of Shaanxi Province who participated in the meeting expressed their support for the Premier’s instructions and expressed their determination to implement them. (Once again proving that Hu Wei and others are Zhou Enlai’s lackeys)

Under the instigation of Jiang Qing’s “cultural attack and military defense” and Wang Li and Guan Feng’s editorials “catching a handful of people in the army”, (proving that these people are Mao Zedong’s lackeys) the gradually stable situation became tense again. A rebel group plotted to rob the PLA’s arsenal, and Zhou Enlai ordered Hu Wei: “You must send troops to protect them. If necessary, you can shoot!” (Proving that the armed struggle was instigated by Zhou Enlai.)

The troops under the command of Commander Hu Wei were specially sent by the Central Military Commission to Shaanxi Province to carry out the “three branches and two armies” mission. (The so-called Central Military Commission is actually Zhou Enlai) It is natural that they should go all out to devote themselves to this work. After they entered Shaanxi Province, they selected a large number of cadres and soldiers to form hundreds of “Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams” (under the banner of Mao Zedong, opposing Mao Zedong, carrying the red flag to oppose the red flag) and entered factories, mines and some enterprises and institutions. At the same time, they gathered students from four colleges and universities including Xi’an Jiaotong University for a one-month military training. In this way, the students were stabilized on campus, reducing the impact and interference on society. Through military training, the communication and understanding between students and PLA officers and soldiers were deepened, and the feelings between them were deepened. At the same time, because the ideological understanding of the main leading cadres of the party, government and army in Shaanxi Province was relatively unified and their work was done properly, the situation in Shaanxi Province soon stabilized. (Zhou Enlai controlled the situation in Shaanxi and regained power)

In late May 1967, Huang Jingyao and Hu Wei, commanders of the Shaanxi Provincial Military Region, were ordered to go to Beijing to report to Zhou Enlai and the Central Cultural Revolution Group.

On the evening of May 24, 1967, Zhou Enlai met with Huang Jingyao and Hu Wei in the office of the Central Cultural Revolution Meeting in Building 16 of Diaoyutai. At the same time, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Qi Benyu and other members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group also participated in the meeting.

After listening to the reports of Huang Jingyao and Hu Wei, Zhou Enlai was very satisfied. (Zhou Enlai was in power, so he was satisfied) He first affirmed the work done in Shaanxi Province, and instructed them to do a better job in the mass organizations of the two factions, to promote the unity of the two factions, (Zhou Enlai wanted both factions to listen to him) to consolidate and develop the achievements that had been made. He also pointed out in particular: “Bourgeois factionalism is very stubborn, you must be vigilant, prevent factionalism from expanding, and prevent the situation from reversing.”

Many kind comrades thought that Shaanxi Province would be calm from then on. No matter how the movement was carried out, there would be a field army in Shaanxi, at least there would not be any major chaos. But they did not expect that soon after, Jiang Qing’s speech on “cultural attack and military defense” and Wang Li and Guan Feng’s editorial on “catching a handful of people in the army” drafted and revised for the Red Flag magazine, set off another wave of evil in China.

On July 22, 1967, Jiang Qing said when meeting with the Henan rebel delegation: “We can’t be too naive. When a small group of people who instigated armed struggle take up arms to attack you, the revolutionary masses can take up arms to defend themselves. After the two sides reached an agreement to stop the armed struggle, if they still don’t put down their weapons, you can’t put down your weapons of self-defense! I remember that it seemed that a revolutionary organization in Henan proposed such a slogan, called “cultural attack and military defense.” This slogan is correct. We insist on the cultural struggle proposed by Chairman Mao and firmly oppose armed struggle. This is the first point. … But there is a second point, we can’t be naive. When they don’t put down their weapons and point guns, spears, and swords at you, you put down your weapons. This is wrong, and you will suffer…”

The next day, Wenhui Daily disclosed the spirit of Jiang Qing’s speech. In this way, the rebels across the country seemed to have heard the charge, and they all paraded around under the banner of “cultural attack and military defense”, and the armed struggle intensified and gradually escalated.

On August 1, 1967, Red Flag magazine published an editorial drafted by Wang Li, Guan Feng and others, “The Proletariat Must Firmly Grasp the Gun – Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army”. The editorial said: “We must further carry out the great criticism of the revolution and thoroughly sweep the handful of capitalist roaders in the party and the army into the garbage dump. Only in this way can we prevent the restoration of capitalism. … At present, a great criticism movement against the largest handful of capitalist roaders in the party and the army is being launched across the country. This is the general direction of the struggle.”

The editorial drafted by Wang Li and Guan Feng also had a very bad impact. After the editorial was published, mass organizations across the country pointed the spearhead of the struggle at the PLA, posted big-character posters “Catch a handful of people in the army”, attacked the PLA barracks, beat up the cadres and soldiers of the troops, robbed guns and ammunition, and even openly robbed the PLA’s weapons and ammunition depots.

On August 5, 1967, the fourth day after Wang Li and Guan Feng published their editorial “Catch a handful of people in the army”, large-character posters and large slogans of “Catch a handful of people in the army” were posted on the streets of Xi’an, which were eye-catching and shocking. One group of mass organizations mobilized tens of thousands of people to march on the streets and sit in front of the army. The other group of mass organizations that opposed them also mobilized tens of thousands of people to march on the streets (one group was Mao Zedong, the other was Zhou Enlai) and shouted slogans: “There is no good end for those who oppose the army and disrupt the army!”

The two groups of mass organizations in Xi’an, whose contradictions had been eased, suddenly glared at each other and became irreconcilable. The contradictions between the two groups gradually intensified, and finally a large-scale armed conflict occurred on September 2, 1967. Fortunately, the PLA officers and soldiers arrived at the scene of the armed conflict in time to avoid greater casualties. (Don’t believe the lies of the Communist Party’s brainwashing, it was Zhou Enlai who was taking sides)

On September 4, 1967, the military switchboard in Xi’an suddenly received a call from Beijing. It was from the Premier’s Office of the State Council, saying that the Premier wanted General Hu Wei to answer the phone.

Hu Wei picked up the microphone and heard the familiar voice of the Premier. Zhou Enlai told Hu Wei: A group of mass organizations in Xi’an left Xi’an and fled to the area near the People’s Liberation Army arsenal in a certain place in Shaanxi Province, and gathered with the local rebel organizations to try to rob the weapons and ammunition there.

After introducing the situation, Zhou Enlai said in an imperative tone: “Comrade Hu Wei, you must send troops to protect them strictly. If necessary, you can shoot!”

Just like accepting combat missions in wartime, Hu Wei put his legs together and stood straight. Holding the microphone, he spoke with a strong Henan accent and said firmly: “Please rest assured, Premier, we will resolutely implement the Premier’s orders and ensure the completion of the task!”

The rebels’ fighting escalated from broadswords and spears to the use of real guns and real cannons. The Central Committee issued an order: The People’s Liberation Army “has the right to self-defense and counterattack” when encountering special circumstances. The attempt of the rebels in Xi’an to rob the weapons and ammunition depot failed.

During the interview, when I heard General Hu Wei say that Premier Zhou Enlai had personally issued an order to him that “you can shoot”, I was very surprised. This extremely rare phenomenon is not only unheard of by me, but also by comrades who have been engaged in party history research for a long time. So, what was the last resort that prompted Zhou Enlai to use such harsh words? In order to understand the historical background of this incident, the author consulted a lot of relevant materials and conducted a lot of investigations.

During the “Cultural Revolution”, the armed struggles across the country can be roughly divided into two periods: First, the early stage of armed struggle. The weapons used by the rebels were generally bricks, sticks, broadswords, spears, etc., which were still in the period of cold weapons; second, the armed struggle reached a certain stage. At this stage, the opposing armed struggle teams in various places wanted to kill each other, and they all felt that the original fight was not enough, so they tried every means to get weapons and equipment.

In order to get real guns and cannons, they first turned their attention to the grassroots people’s armed forces and militia organizations. In the 1960s, my country’s medium-sized and above state-owned factories and rural people’s communes all had people’s armed forces and militia organizations, and were equipped with a certain amount of weapons and ammunition. Therefore, the weapons and ammunition of these grassroots people’s armed forces and militia organizations were first robbed by the “rebels”.

After Jiang Qing’s speech of “cultural attack and military defense” and Wang Li and Guan Feng’s editorial of “catching a handful of people in the army” came out, the rebels began to openly rob the weapons and ammunition of the local military sub-districts, provincial military regions, and PLA troops.

On August 9, 1967, the weapons and ammunition of the first and second arsenals of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Region were robbed by the rebels one after another. Mortars, light and heavy machine guns, submachine guns, pistols, signal guns, grenades, bullets, etc. were robbed. From the end of July to the end of August 1967, the weapons and ammunition depots of Shaoyang Military Sub-district and Shaoyang Armed Forces in Hunan Province were successively robbed by the rebels, and various guns, mortars, grenades, bullets, etc. were robbed.

In response to this serious situation, on September 5, 1967, with the approval of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group jointly issued the “Order on Not Looting the People’s Liberation Army’s Weapons, Equipment and Various Military Supplies”. The order reiterated: Any mass organization and any person, no matter which faction they belong to, are not allowed to rob the People’s Liberation Army’s weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, equipment, and supplies under any pretext; they are not allowed to rob weapons, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, equipment, and supplies in munitions warehouses, military warehouses, and national defense enterprises; they are not allowed to intercept weapons and ammunition loaded on trains, cars, and ships; and external personnel are not allowed to enter the command organs of the People’s Liberation Army. … Anyone who violates this order in the future shall be convicted of violating the law of the country. Local garrison

When executing the above order, we must first patiently carry out political and ideological work, explain the reasons, and dissuade them. If dissuasion is ineffective, we can fire warning shots into the air to order them to withdraw. When dissuasion and warnings are ineffective, we can declare that this kind of snatching is a counter-revolutionary act, and take measures to arrest and prosecute the few bad leaders and perpetrators. When these people resist arrest and resist, the People’s Liberation Army has the right to implement self-defense counterattacks. Soldiers on duty in coastal defense, border defense, coastal islands, national defense, and confidential areas have the right to self-defense counterattacks when someone seizes their guns.

The order was issued on September 5, 1967, that is, when Premier Zhou Enlai issued the order to Hu Wei on September 4, 1967 that “you can shoot when necessary”, the “September 5th Order” had already been decided to be issued. (This is Zhou Enlai’s way of doing things without leaking a single drop of water. In fact, it was a political struggle between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai)

When I interviewed General Hu Wei, he said with great emotion: “Premier Zhou has always been cautious and would not easily issue an order to shoot. This was also a last resort! The weapons and equipment in this warehouse can equip several infantry divisions. Once they are robbed, the entire Shaanxi Province will be in chaos. Not only that, it will also threaten neighboring provinces. After Premier Zhou called me, he asked Comrade Wu Bin, the liaison officer of the Premier’s Office of the State Council, to call the rebel leader of Xi’an Jiaotong University and instruct them to immediately withdraw all the personnel who were preparing to rob weapons and ammunition.” On September 4, 1967, after Hu Wei received Zhou Enlai’s call, he immediately issued an order to Commander Xu Baojian without hesitation, asking him to personally lead a battalion of troops to rush to the arsenal in the shortest time and take over the defense of the arsenal.

Because of the Premier’s order to “shoot”, the officers and soldiers of the army were no longer timid. As soon as the troops arrived at the arsenal, Xu Baojian ordered the soldiers to take over the defense of the arsenal and set up several cordons inside and outside. They set up machine guns, loaded bullets, and warned the rebels: If anyone dared to cross the cordon to grab weapons and ammunition, the People’s Liberation Army would execute Premier Zhou’s order and shoot to stop them! (They had long wanted to kill people)

Under the powerful military deterrence of the PLA commanders and fighters, the attempt of the rebels in Xi’an to rob the weapons and ammunition in the depot did not succeed.

The two fighting teams in Sichuan and Shaanxi joined together, intending to seize a national strategic reserve oil depot deep in the Qinling Mountains. Zhou Enlai called Hu Wei directly again and ordered him to send troops to stop it immediately

On May 1, 1968, 300,000 people in Xi’an held a grand celebration meeting in Xincheng Square in the city center, officially announcing the establishment of the Shaanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Li Ruishan was appointed director of the Shaanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Huang Jingyao, Hu Wei and 11 others were appointed deputy directors. (The so-called Revolutionary Committee must include Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and there are people from both factions)

Although the Provincial Revolutionary Committee was established, the situation in Shaanxi Province was still very serious. The main manifestation was that the armed conflicts in the neighboring provinces of Henan Province, Shanxi Province, Sichuan Province, and Hubei Province continued. Under their influence, the vicious incidents and large-scale armed conflicts in Shaanxi Province were gradually escalating and expanding, and there was a trend of collusion and mutual support between the rebels and armed fighters inside and outside the province.

One day in late May 1968, the military switchboard in Xi’an once again received a call from Premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai first informed Hu Wei of a situation: a fighting team of several hundred people in Guangyuan, Sichuan Province, rushed into Shaanxi Province along the Baocheng Railway, and formed a group with a fighting team in Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province, and surrounded a national strategic reserve oil depot deep in the Qinling Mountains and near the Baocheng Railway. Then, Zhou Enlai gave Hu Wei an order on the phone: “Comrade Hu Wei, you should send troops to solve this problem immediately!”

After hanging up the phone, Hu Wei immediately ordered Sun Yushui, the commander of a certain division of the People’s Liberation Army stationed in Baoji City, to lead two battalions of troops to quickly go deep into the Qinling Mountains to protect the country’s strategic reserve oil depots and stop and calm the situation there.

Due to the emergency situation, when Sun Yushui received the order to lead his troops to set off, he had no time to mobilize the troops and just pulled the troops away.

It was raining that night. In the night, the Qinling Mountains were covered with dark clouds and thunder and lightning. With short and urgent commands, the cadres and soldiers of the six companies stepped on the splashing rain and ran to gather. The officers and soldiers in raincoats were armed with guns and looked serious, and they boarded the trucks in Baoji City one after another. With the roar of car engines, the headlights of cars were like sharp swords, splitting the rain, fog and night, and rushing into the Qinling Mountains like a long snake.

Before the troops set out, Sun Yushui had issued an order to Zhang Wenbin, the regiment commander stationed in Lueyang County, Shaanxi Province, to lead two companies to take a train from Lueyang to the oil depot. Two troops, separate and attack together.

Today, Sun Yushui has passed away. I interviewed Zhang Wenbin, who now lives in Xi’an. Before retiring, Zhang Wenbin served as deputy commander of the Hanzhong Military Sub-district and commander of the Shangluo Military Sub-district. He recalled: “There is a large oil depot in the Qinling Mountains, seven or eight kilometers away from the Baoji-Chengdu Railway Line. The train pulled the tanker to a railway station near the oil depot, and then transported the oil to the oil depot through the oil pipeline. It was set up in the rear of the Third Front in the 1960s based on national strategic needs. One night in late May 1968, Division Commander Sun Yushui suddenly called me from Baoji and ordered me to lead the two companies stationed in Lueyang to set off by train. The two troops were divided and attacked together. That night I contacted the Lueyang Railway Department and dispatched a locomotive with five or six carriages attached to the back. The roads in the Qinling Mountains were not easy to travel, and that night It was still raining heavily. When the troops led by Division Commander Sun Yushui arrived in Fengxian, they had to stop for a while because the rain was too heavy and the mountain road was muddy. Before setting off, Division Commander Sun did not have time to mobilize the troops. He mobilized the troops in Fengxian. When mobilizing, Division Commander Sun told the cadres and soldiers: where are we going tonight, what is the mission, and put forward requirements for everyone… When leaving Baoji, the six companies were confused and didn’t know where the division commander was going to take them! “

Around 12 noon the next day, the six companies led by Sun Yushui and the two companies led by Zhang Wenbin arrived near the oil depot almost at the same time. Regardless of the fatigue of the long march, Sun Yushui commanded the troops to quickly control the oil depot, occupied several hills around the railway station and the oil depot, occupied the commanding heights, and arranged several cordons inside and outside.

The two fighting teams from Guangyuan, Sichuan and Hanzhong, Shaanxi got the news from somewhere that the People’s Liberation Army had sent a large number of troops, marching day and night towards here, so they fled in fear. Therefore, the People’s Liberation Army did not have direct contact and conflict with them.

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