国际大媒体：习近平为何存在感这么弱。胡锦涛派系的吴胜利在刷存在感。春晚收视率南北差异
大家好，有人在网上贴出了今年2025年的春晚收视率。看着不是很直观啊。这个地图比较直观。但是这张地图并不是今年的，而是以前的。其实我们仔细看，东北三省的春晚收视率和前几年相比，不但没有下降，反而上升了。感觉是越来越回归基本盘，东三省本来就是80%的人看， 现在直接奔90%去了。广东广西，本来只有个位数的观众看春晚，现在直接奔零去了。我个人呢，的确是很多很多年没有看春晚了。
通过观察央视春晚的收视率，从北往南可以看出，收视率逐渐降低。在广西和海南，收视率已经降到2%以下。这种现象不仅仅是地域差异和文化差异所致。
从安徽开始，南方省份的收视率出现了明显的下降，全部低于25%。多年前，就有专家讨论过这个问题，认为春晚是北方人在寒冷冬季里自娱自乐的节目，尤其是东北三省和北京、天津等北方地区的自娱自乐。南方人对春晚除了感到距离上的陌生，还有文化上的分裂感。
无论是从春晚的数据，还是现代中国整体文化产业的发展趋势来看，南北方的文化差异始终存在。未来，这种差距可能会越来越大，最终的结果可能导致南北方的文化进一步分裂。
这个话题再往大里说，往政治上说，如果全国的春晚的收视率都是个位数，那么这个春假还要不要继续办下去。继续办下去有什么意义。如果再延伸一下，如果这个收视率是对中共的支持率，那么，如果全国的支持率都是个数位，共产党还能维持他的独裁统治吗？
首先，春晚作为中国新年期间的重要文化活动，已经成为许多北方家庭的传统。然而，如果春晚的收视率持续下降，甚至降到个位数，那么继续举办春晚的意义就值得探讨。春晚的初衷是中共为了团结全国人民，传递所谓正能量和独裁文化价值观。如果收视率低，说明观众对其兴趣减弱，可能是因为节目内容不再符合观众的口味，或者是因为观众有了其他更有吸引力的娱乐选择。
其次，从政治角度来看，春晚的收视率也可以反映出民众对政府的支持程度。如果春晚的收视率低，可能意味着民众对政府宣传的内容不感兴趣，甚至产生了反感。这种情况下，继续举办春晚可能会被视为一种形式主义，失去了实际意义。
进一步延伸，如果我们将春晚的收视率类比为对中共的支持率，那么如果全国的支持率都是个位数，确实会对中共的统治产生影响。一个政权的稳定性在很大程度上依赖于民众的支持。如果支持率低，说明民众对政府的不满情绪高涨，可能会导致政治变革，共产党下台。
首先，民主制度的建立和维持需要一系列的条件，包括法治、自由的媒体、独立的司法体系以及公民的参与和监督。如果一个国家缺乏这些基本条件，即使引入了民主制度，可能也很难维持下去。当然了，有民主制度是一个前提，而中国恰恰缺少这个前提。
其次，民众的素质和教育水平也是影响民主制度能否成功的重要因素。民主制度要求公民具备一定的政治素养和参与意识，能够理性地进行政治选择和监督政府。
就说开车在美国加拿大开车没有多人，那么不要脸用最右侧的出口车道，去前面加塞儿。在大国这不是扯淡吗？早就把那条道堵上了。在民主制度的前提下，是靠素质，靠自觉。光靠制度，运行成本太高了。
美国国防部发言人约翰·尤利奥特宣布，新任国防部长皮特·赫格塞思下令剥夺美军前参谋长联席会议主席马克·米利的安保待遇，并暂停他的涉密许可。除下达上述命令，赫格塞思还要求成立审查委员会，调查米利在美国总统唐纳德·川普第一任期内“破坏军队指挥系统”的行为，并打算把米利退役时的军衔从四星上将降为中将。
米利百分百是叛国，米利给共产国家，独裁国家中国的参谋长李作成打的两通电话。还撒谎说高层指示，其实完全都是米利自作主张。全都是米利自己想象出来的。川普根本没有打算攻击中国。米利就是精神病。
拜登2025年1月20日在即将卸任时赦免米利等人，就是为了防备特朗普上台后报复他们。一方面，这意味着川普没办法再治米利罪，也意味着在拜登眼里，米利也的确有罪。没罪的话，拜登赦免米利干吗？美国是三权分立，司法独立的国家。川普既没有审判的权力，也没有给米利判刑的权力。拜登把自己家的亲戚，一般人都不知道的他们有问题，都给赦免，那就证明他们真的是贪污，真的是犯罪。
《日本经济新闻》报道习近平在重要军事晚会上为何存在感这么弱。其实这个我说过，但毕竟是我这个小小自媒体说，而《日本经济新闻》是正经的国际大媒体。国际大媒体也关注到了这个问题。中泽克二是《日本经济新闻》东京资深编辑兼社论作家，曾在中国担任七年记者，并后续担任中国分社社长。2014年获国际新闻奖。他在专栏文章中认为，最近的一场中国军方活动，罕见地揭示了中国高层内部的真实动态。
2025年1月17日，中央军委在北京为军队元老和退役军官举办了一场晚会。作为惯例，71岁的最高领导人习近平出席了这一活动。以往中共的报道，为了突出习近平，是由严格的限制的。通常是限制习近平与军方高层和老将军同框的次数。来达到突出习近平定于一尊的目的。然而，今年的情况却截然不同。
今年央视的镜头感觉和自媒体拍起来也没什么区别。
今年的电视画面开头，习近平与张又侠、何卫东一同进入会场，并与老军人握手寒暄，随后就座。
在观看解放军文艺演出时，习近平最初坐在两位现任中央军委副主席和三位前任副主席中间，之后又出现在包括11名现任及前任军方高层的更大合影中。
影片中对习近平的唯一特写出现在最后，习近平在为表演者鼓掌，似乎有意将这一特写安排在最后，以降低他的存在感。
相比之下，去年的央视报道对习近平的呈现方式截然不同，共有四次特写，其中一次出现在影片开头，给人的感觉是这场晚会是专门为他举办的，而非献给退役军官的年度活动。但在今年的晚会上，习近平刻意保持了低调。习近平应该不是一个低调了，也不是一个会刻意，或者主动低调的人。天天要么是定于一尊，要么是亲自指挥，亲自部署。
习近平装是他上台装，现在又开始装。吴胜利，是胡锦涛派
李继耐，是江泽民派
范长龙，是江泽民派
何卫东，是习近平派
习近平
张又侠，是江泽民派
曹刚川，是江泽民派
许其亮，是胡锦涛派
赵克石，是习近平派
刘振立，是胡锦涛派
以前习近平突出自己，就是怕这些老军头抢了他的风头。现在一个个在这里排排坐，如果不是习近平坐在这里，还以为是反习派在团建，在开联欢会呢
79岁的退役海军上将吴胜利也出席了晚会。此前，围绕他的各种传闻曾引发猜测，而此次亮相被外界视为他的正式回归。中国社交媒体上甚至出现了专门关注吴胜利重新露面的文章。这说明吴胜利是大家公认的胡锦涛的人，习近平早就想抓吴胜利了，是胡锦涛把吴胜利保下来的。现在都大大方方出来看表演了。就是习近平已经彻底拿吴胜利没辙了，习近平但凡有权力，不会让吴胜利出来得瑟的。好的，谢谢大家。
英文翻译
International media: Why is Xi Jinping so weak? Wu Shengli of Hu Jintao’s faction is trying to make himself more visible. Differences in Spring Festival Gala ratings between the north and the south Hello everyone, someone posted the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala in 2025 online. It’s not very intuitive. This map is more intuitive. But this map is not from this year, but from the past. In fact, if we look closely, the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala in the three northeastern provinces have not only not decreased compared with previous years, but have increased. It feels like it is returning to the basics. The three northeastern provinces originally had 80% of people watching, but now it has directly reached 90%. In Guangdong and Guangxi, there were only single-digit viewers watching the Spring Festival Gala, but now it has directly reached zero. Personally, I haven’t watched the Spring Festival Gala for many, many years. By observing the ratings of CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala, it can be seen from north to south that the ratings are gradually decreasing. In Guangxi and Hainan, the ratings have dropped below 2%. This phenomenon is not only due to regional and cultural differences. Starting from Anhui, the ratings of southern provinces have dropped significantly, all below 25%. Many years ago, experts discussed this issue and believed that the Spring Festival Gala is a program for northerners to entertain themselves in the cold winter, especially for the three northeastern provinces and northern regions such as Beijing and Tianjin. In addition to feeling unfamiliar with the Spring Festival Gala, southerners also feel a sense of cultural division. Whether from the data of the Spring Festival Gala or the development trend of the overall cultural industry in modern China, the cultural differences between the north and the south always exist. In the future, this gap may become larger and larger, and the final result may lead to further cultural division between the north and the south. To talk about this topic more broadly, politically speaking, if the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala nationwide are in the single digits, then should this spring holiday continue? What is the point of continuing to hold it? If we extend it further, if this rating is the support rate for the Communist Party of China, then if the national support rate is in the single digits, can the Communist Party still maintain its dictatorship? First of all, as an important cultural event during the Chinese New Year, the Spring Festival Gala has become a tradition for many northern families. However, if the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala continue to decline, even to the single digits, then the significance of continuing to hold the Spring Festival Gala is worth discussing. The original intention of the Spring Festival Gala was for the Chinese Communist Party to unite the people of the country and convey the so-called positive energy and authoritarian cultural values. If the ratings are low, it means that the audience’s interest in it has waned, perhaps because the content of the program no longer suits the audience’s taste, or because the audience has other more attractive entertainment options. Secondly, from a political perspective, the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala can also reflect the public’s support for the government. If the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala are low, it may mean that the public is not interested in the content of the government propaganda, or even disgusted. In this case, continuing to hold the Spring Festival Gala may be regarded as a formalism and lose its practical significance. Further extension, if we compare the ratings of the Spring Festival Gala to the support rate for the Chinese Communist Party, then if the national support rate is in the single digit, it will indeed have an impact on the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. The stability of a regime depends to a large extent on the support of the people. If the support rate is low, it means that the public’s dissatisfaction with the government is high, which may lead to political change and the Communist Party’s resignation. First, the establishment and maintenance of a democratic system requires a series of conditions, including the rule of law, a free media, an independent judicial system, and citizen participation and supervision. If a country lacks these basic conditions, even if it introduces a democratic system, it may be difficult to maintain it. Of course, having a democratic system is a prerequisite, and China lacks this prerequisite. Secondly, the quality and education level of the people are also important factors that affect whether the democratic system can succeed. The democratic system requires citizens to have a certain political literacy and sense of participation, and to be able to make rational political choices and supervise the government. Let’s say that there are not many people driving in the United States and Canada, so shamelessly use the rightmost exit lane to cut in front. Isn’t this nonsense in a big country? That road has been blocked for a long time. Under the premise of a democratic system, it depends on quality and self-consciousness. Relying on the system alone, the operating cost is too high. John Ullyot, a spokesman for the US Department of Defense, announced that the new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered the deprivation of security benefits for former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army Mark Milley and the suspension of his confidentiality license. In addition to issuing the above order, Hegseth also requested the establishment of a review committee to investigate Milley’s “undermining the military command system” during the first term of US President Donald Trump, and intended to reduce Milley’s rank from four-star general to lieutenant general when he retired. Milley is 100% treasonous. Milley made two calls to Li Zuocheng, the chief of staff of the communist and dictatorial country China. He also lied that it was instructions from the top, but in fact it was all Milley’s own decision. It was all imagined by Milley himself. Trump had no intention of attacking China at all. Milley is mentally ill. Biden pardoned Milley and others on January 20, 2025 when he was about to leave office, just to prevent Trump from retaliating against them after taking office. On the one hand, this means that Trump can no longer convict Milley, and it also means that in Biden’s eyes, Milley is indeed guilty. If he is not guilty, why did Biden pardon Milley? The United States is a country with separation of powers and judicial independence. Trump has neither the power to judge nor the power to sentence Milley. Biden pardoned all his relatives, who were not known to the general public, and they had problems, which proves that they were really corrupt and really committed crimes. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported why Xi Jinping had such a weak presence at important military evening parties. Actually, I have said this, but after all, it was said by a small self-media, and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun is a serious international media. International media have also paid attention to this issue. Nakazawa Katsuji is a senior editor and editorial writer of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Tokyo. He worked as a reporter in China for seven years and later served as the president of the China branch. He won the International News Award in 2014. In his column, he believes that a recent Chinese military event has rarely revealed the true dynamics within the Chinese top leadership. On January 17, 2025, the Central Military Commission held a party for military veterans and retired officers in Beijing. As a convention, the 71-year-old top leader Xi Jinping attended the event. In the past, the CCP’s reports were strictly restricted in order to highlight Xi Jinping. Usually, the number of times Xi Jinping appeared in the same frame with military leaders and old generals was limited. To achieve the purpose of highlighting Xi Jinping’s one-man rule. However, this year, the situation is completely different. This year, CCTV’s footage feels no different from that of self-media. At the beginning of this year’s TV footage, Xi Jinping enters the venue with Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, shakes hands with the old soldiers, and then takes his seat. When watching the PLA’s art performance, Xi Jinping initially sits between two current vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission and three former vice chairmen, and then appears in a larger group photo including 11 current and former military leaders. The only close-up of Xi Jinping in the film appears at the end, when Xi Jinping applauds the performers, and it seems that this close-up is deliberately arranged at the end to reduce his presence. In contrast, last year’s CCTV report presented Xi Jinping in a completely different way, with a total of four close-ups, one of which appeared at the beginning of the film, giving people the feeling that this party was held specifically for him, rather than an annual event dedicated to retired officers. But at this year’s party, Xi Jinping deliberately kept a low profile. Xi Jinping should not be a low-key person, nor is he a person who will deliberately or actively keep a low profile. Every day, he is either determined by one person or personally directs and deploys. Xi Jinping pretended to be a Hu Jintao faction. Li Jinai is a Jiang Zemin faction. Fan Changlong is a Jiang Zemin faction. He Weidong is a Xi Jinping faction. Xi Jinping. Zhang Youxia is a Jiang Zemin faction. Cao Gangchuan is a Jiang Zemin faction. Xu Qiliang is a Hu Jintao faction. Zhao Keshi is a Xi Jinping faction. Liu Zhenli is a Hu Jintao faction. Xi Jinping used to highlight himself because he was afraid that these old military leaders would steal his limelight. Now they are sitting here in a row. If Xi Jinping hadn’t been sitting here, I would have thought that the anti-Xi faction was having a team building or a party. 79-year-old retired admiral Wu Shengli also attended the party. Previously, various rumors surrounding him had sparked speculation, and this appearance was seen by the outside world as his official return. There were even articles on Chinese social media specifically focusing on Wu Shengli’s reappearance. This shows that Wu Shengli is recognized by everyone as Hu Jintao’s man. Xi Jinping has long wanted to arrest Wu Shengli, and it was Hu Jintao who saved Wu Shengli. Now they all come out to watch the show openly. Xi Jinping is completely helpless against Wu Shengli. If Xi Jinping has power, he will not let Wu Shengli show off. Okay, thank you everyone.